Enforcing free roaming among UE countries: an economic analysis by Maillé, Patrick & Tuffin, Bruno
HAL Id: hal-01428920
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01428920
Submitted on 6 Jan 2017
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Enforcing free roaming among UE countries: an
economic analysis
Patrick Maillé, Bruno Tuffin
To cite this version:
Patrick Maillé, Bruno Tuffin. Enforcing free roaming among UE countries: an economic analysis. 13th
International Conference on Network and Service Management (CNSM), Nov 2017, Tokyo, Japan.
￿hal-01428920￿
Enforcing free roaming among UE countries: an
economic analysis
Patrick Maillé
IMT Atlantique
Rennes, France
Email: patrick.maille@imt-atlantique.fr
Bruno Tuffin
Inria
Rennes, France
Email: bruno.tuffin@inria.fr
Abstract—In October 2015, the European parliament has
decided to forbid roaming charges among UE mobile phone users,
starting June 2017, as a first step toward the unification of the
European digital market.
In this paper, we aim at investigating the consequences of
such a measure from an economic perspective. In particular, we
analyze the effect of the willingness-to-pay heterogeneity among
users (also due to wealth heterogeneity), and the fact that the
roaming behavior is positively correlated with wealth.
Considering a monopolistic operator, we compare the paid-
roaming situation (with usage-based pricing) to the envisioned
free-roaming from the point of view of the operator and of users.
Our analysis suggests that imposing free roaming degrades the
revenues of the operator but can also deter some users from
subscribing. This is because paid roaming allows some partial
market segmentation; hence we conclude that such (apparently
beneficial) regulatory decisions must be taken with care.
I. INTRODUCTION
Users are more and more dependent on online services (e-
mail, geographical mapping, ridesharing, ...), and maintaining
access to those services while abroad is increasingly valuable.
Hence a strong demand for the possibility of roaming, i.e., of
having an operator in the visited country provide connectivity
services in a seamless manner. This is done through arrange-
ments between operators, that we do not consider in this paper.
We rather focus here on the economic aspects of roaming from
the user point of view through the prices charged. Since user
willingness-to-pay for global connectivity is large, and because
of very limited competition on that segment [2], [4], the market
ends up with relatively high prices for such services.
While some existing work consider the economic aspects of
national roaming, with cooperation/competition issues among
operators [7], we concentrate on international roaming. More
precisely, we investigate the potential impact of the recent de-
cision of the European parliament1 to forbid roaming charges
in Europe as of June 15, 2017. Already, since April 2016 those
roaming charges have been capped, as a period of transition.
The aim of those decisions is to create an open European
digital market, and foster economic activity by easing travels
among EU countries. Also, imposing free-of-charge roaming
carries an idea of improved fairness among users, while paid
roaming could lead to prohibitive costs for some users. Finally,
1https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/
new-rules-roaming-charges-and-open-internet
it is well-known that users have a preference for flat-rate
pricing; having no extra charge whatever the data usage (in
volume and geography terms) goes in that direction. This was
pointed out in [3], but at the time (2009) free roaming seemed
like an unrealistic option.
Our claim in this paper is that free roaming being beneficial
is not always obvious. To investigate the question, we take
a simple model with one monopoly operator implementing
usage-based roaming pricing (when allowed), and consider the
pricing decisions with and without the free-roaming constraint.
Our user-side model assumes that there is a positive correlation
between the willingness-to-pay for the domestic connectivity
service, and the willingness-to-pay for the roaming connec-
tivity service, since both are linked to user wealth (and in
addition, we expect wealthier people to travel more often).
Assuming the operator selects revenue-maximizing prices for
both cases [5], we show that imposing free-of-charge roaming
to the operator can actually worsen the situation for several
actors: the operator revenue diminishes, less users subscribe to
the (domestic) service, and the least wealthy users would have
preferred the paid-roaming situation. This is due to the fact
that extra roaming prices allow to discriminate high-income
users: the operator can charge less for the basic service and
still make substantial revenues through roaming charges that
it collects mainly from those wealthy users. Removing that
option, all users are charged the same amount: as the unique
revenue source, the subscription price is larger, leading to less
users subscribing to the service and low-income users being
worse off. In summary, enforcing free roaming only benefits
to high-income users, to the expense of low-income ones,
a phenomenon going against the initial fairness-improvement
aim of free roaming. Hence our recommendation is that those
aspects be considered with care when making such regulatory
decisions or monitoring their implementation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents our model for user preferences and operator
revenues. The outcomes are computed in Section III, and
the paid-roaming and free-roaming situations are compared
in Section IV. Conclusions and directions for future work are
given in Section V.
II. MODEL
Our mathematical model focuses on a single country, but
we keep in mind that different countries will correspond to
different markets, hence different distributions among user
willingness-to-pay for digital services: this is particularly
salient in the UE, where GDP per capita among countries vary
by a factor up to 152.
Note that the envisioned rules allow operators to limit
roaming rights for frequent travelers, hence we assume here
that users can only subscribe to providers operating in their
country of residence3, a rule imposed by the EU to prevent
(unfair) competition between countries. Therefore, the rule
does not exactly create a unified European market, and we
can still expect discrepancies among subscription prices in
different countries.
A. Pricing plan
In this paper, we assume that a monopolistic provider
operates in the considered country: following the most popular
data plans, we consider that this provider offers an unlimited
data consumption plan when in the residence country, at a
price (per month) p. Market segmentation and the choice of
other quota-based plans are worth studying but are beyond the
scope of this paper, where we focus on the impact of roaming
charges.
Again following the current market conditions, we assume
that roaming data is charged based on usage, through a simple
linear pricing scheme. The price per volume unit for roaming
traffic is denoted by c, so that a user consuming a roaming
volume v (possibly null) over a month, is charged a total
amount p+ cv.
B. User preferences
For this plan, users have different willingness-to-pay values
(in monetary units per month) for the domestic data use. We
denote that value for a particular user by θ, and assume that
the distribution of θ over the market is known to the operator.
Also, users have different needs and preferences in terms
of data consumption while roaming: some just travel less than
others, and some are willing to pay more for mobile access
than others in roaming situations. Nevertheless, we expect a
positive correlation between the willingness-to-pay θ for the
(local) data plan, and the willingness-to-pay function (in terms
of volume) for roaming data, which we denote by rθ(·), a
function of the consumed volume over a month.
As a result, for a generic user characterized by θ, the net
utility when subscribing to the operator’s offer and consuming
a volume vr per month (on average) when roaming is of the
form
U = θ − p+ rθ(vr)− cvr. (1)
In this paper, to carry out analytical derivations, a specific
form for rθ will be considered, as commonly adopted in [1],
[6], but other choices can be studied similarly:
2Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_European_Union
3http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3111_en.htm
Assumption A: For any value of θ, the function rθ is such
that
rθ(x) =
{
θx− αx
2
2 if x ≤
θ
α
θ2
2α otherwise.
with α a fixed parameter. The marginal valuation function r′θ
then has the simple expression
r′θ(x) = [θ − αx]+
where [y]+ := max(y, 0).
Functions defined by Assumption A are non-negative, null at 0,
non-decreasing and concave, and cover some expected effects:
• users with high θ values (i.e., willing to pay more for the
plan even without roaming) are also willing to pay more
for roaming data usage than users with low θ values;
• and those users are more frequently out of their residence
country, so that if roaming was at no extra cost (i.e.,
c = 0) they would consume a larger amount of roaming
data, here θα .
III. USER CHOICES AND OPERATOR REVENUE FOR FIXED
PRICES
We assume here that the subscription price p as well as the
roaming data per-unit price c are fixed by the operator, and we
analyze user choices. Later, we will consider that the operator
is able to anticipate those choices, and uses this ability to set
p and c so as to maximize revenue.
A type-θ user will consider whether or not to subscribe–and
if so, how much roaming data to use–based on p and c. To
do so, the user estimates how much roaming data vr(θ) she
would use, and just applies (1): if the net utility is positive the
user subscribes, otherwise she doesn’t. More specifically, we
can define the optimal net value from roaming usage
V (θ, c) := max
x≥0
rθ(x)− cx,
so that the net utility is simply θ − p+ V (θ, c), and the user
subscribes if and only if θ + V (θ, c) > p.
Under Assumption A we simply have V (θ, c) =
(θ−c)2
2α 1l{θ>c}, obtained at a volume v
∗
r (θ) =
[
θ−c
α
]+
, so the
user subscribes if and only if
θ +
(θ − c)2
2α
1l{θ>c} > p. (2)
The left-hand side of (2) is strictly increasing in θ. Conse-
quently, if a user θ subscribes, any other user with θ̃ ≥ θ
also subscribes. Additionally, the left-hand side of (2) is
continuous, null at 0 and tending to infinity when θ → ∞,
hence there exists a unique solution θ̄ of
θ̄ +
(θ̄ − c)2
2α
1l{θ̄>c} = p, (3)
and the set of subscribers is the set D := {θ : θ > θ̄}. We
then have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: For any price pair (p, c) the users who
subscribe are those with θ > θ̄, where
θ̄ = min
(
p, c− α+
√
α2 + 2α[p− c]+
)
. (4)
Proof: If c ≥ p, we immediately check that the solution
to (3) is θ̄ = p.
Alternatively, if c < p the solution to (3) is in the open
interval (c, p). More precisely, θ̄ is the unique root in (c, p) of
the degree-two polynomial
(X − c)2
2α
+X − p,
that is, θ̄ = c− α+
√
α2 + 2α(p− c).
We finally check that (4) summarizes both cases.
A. Payed roaming
We assume without loss of generality a total mass 1 of users.
The ISP has to determine the prices p and c in order to
maximize its revenue. The revenue of the ISP can be written
R(p, c) =
∫ ∞
θ=θ̄
(p+ cv∗r (θ))dF (θ)
where F is the distribution of θ over the population of potential
subscribers, and v∗r (θ) the volume of roaming usage for a type-
θ user. Recall that under Assumption A we have v∗r (θ) =[
θ−c
α
]+
.
We end up with
R(p, c) = p(1− F (θ̄)) + c
∫ ∞
θ=θ̄
[θ − c]+
α
dF (θ).
If F is exponential with rate λ, we have
R(p, c) = pe−λθ̄ +
c
α
e−λθ̄[θ̄ − c]+ + c
α
e−λc
λ
e−λ[θ̄−c]
+
Determining the optimal revenue seems intractable analyti-
cally, but it can easily be done numerically.
B. Free roaming
We now consider the situation where the provider cannot
charge for roaming usage, hence c = 0. In that case, the
subscription price p can be adjusted to maximize revenue.
Proposition 2: For any subscription price p, the set of sub-
scribers is D = (θ̄,∞) =
(
−α+
√
α2 + 2αp,∞
)
and the
revenue can be written R(p, c) = p(1−F (−α+
√
α2 + 2αp)).
If F is exponential with rate λ, the revenue-maximizing p
is p = 1+
√
1+α2λ2
αλ2 .
Proof:
The expression of θ̄ comes directly from c = 0 in Proposi-
tion 1.
Still with c = 0, the expression of the ISP revenue can be
simplified to R(p, 0) = p(1− F (−α+
√
α2 + 2αp)).
For F (x) = 1− e−λx, by differentiating with respect to p,
we get a maximum when 1 − λpα/
√
α2 + 2αp = 0, that is,
p = 1+
√
1+α2λ2
αλ2 .
IV. COMPARING FREE ROAMING TO PAID ROAMING
Our goal in this section is to compare the impact of optimal
strategies defined in the previous section. A question we
would like to answer is: What is the impact of free roaming
with respect to a paid one on the ISP revenue and on users
in general. Let us observe a numerical example, with an
exponential distribution of rate λ of user parameters.
Figure 1 displays the optimal subscription price p in terms
of λ. Without the possibility for the ISP to make extra revenue
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Figure 1. Revenue-maximizing subscription price, in terms of λ with α = 1
from roaming usage, the base subscription price with free
roaming is larger than the one with paid roaming. As expected,
when λ increases (i.e., people are less wealthy) prices decrease
in both cases.
Figure 2 displays the ISP revenue for both free and paid
roaming in terms of λ when using the optimal prices, for α =
1.
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Figure 2. ISP revenue in terms of λ
Paid roaming naturally yields larger revenues since the
provider has more degrees of freedom.
Now let us take a look at users, who differ through their type
(the value of θ in our model). Figure 3 shows the threshold
value θ̄, above which users subscribe and below which they
do not. We observe that θ̄ is larger for free roaming than for
paid roaming, hence imposing free roaming would lead to a
smaller number of subscribers.
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Figure 3. Subscription threshold θ̄, in terms of λ: users with θ > θ̄ subscribe
to the service.
Figures 4 and 5 respectively display the total price paid
(subscription plus possible roaming) and the user utility, for
each type-θ user. The figures show that with paid roaming,
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Figure 4. Total amount paid in terms of θ (at the optimal price), when λ = 0.8
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Figure 5. User utility in terms of θ (at the optimal prices), when λ = 0.8
most of the revenue comes from the most wealthy users, while
with free roaming all subscribers contribute at the same level
to the revenues. In terms of user utility, we can distinguish
three zones for θ:
• users with very low θ values do not subscribe to the
service in any scenario (paid or free roaming), and are
not affected by the change;
• users with high θ values subscribe in both scenarios, but
pay more and consume less in the paid-roaming case than
in the free-roaming case, hence those users would prefer
the free-roaming scenario;
• between those extremes, users strictly prefer the paid-
roaming situation, since they benefit from a lower sub-
scription price (which can allow them to subscribe while
they would not in the free-roaming case) and have a
limited roaming usage.
In addition to looking at the impact of the ISP policy on
each user, we can look at its impact on the population as a
whole, by considering consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is
defined as the aggregated net utility of users:
CS =
∫
D
(θ − p+ rθ(vr(θ))− cvr(θ))dF (θ).
If pr is the revenue-maximizing subscription price in case of
free roaming, and (pp, cp) the revenue-maximizing prices in
case of paid roaming, with CSr and CSp the corresponding
consumers surpluses, we can simplify the formulas:
CSr =
∫ ∞
−α+
√
α2+2prα
(θ − pr + θ2/(2α))dF (θ)
CSp =
∫
D
(
θ − pp +
([θ − cp]+)2
2α
)
dF (θ)
=
[∫ cp
θ̄
(θ − pp)dF (θ)
]+
+
∫ ∞
max(cp,θ̄)
(
θ − pp +
(θ − cp)2
2α
)
dF (θ)
For F exponential with rate λ, we end up with
CSr =
∫
−α+
√
α2+2
1+
√
1+α2λ2
λ2
(
θ −
1 +
√
1 + α2λ2
αλ2
+ θ
2
/(2α)
)
λe
−λθ
dθ
= e
(−λ(−α+
√
(α2λ2+2
√
α2λ2+1+2)/λ2
√
α2λ2 + 2
√
α2λ2 + 1 + 2 + 1
αλ2
CSp =
[
−
e−λθ̄λp− e−λθ̄λθ̄ + e−λccλ− e−λcλp− e−λθ̄ + e−λc
λ
]+
+e
−λx 2αλ
2(x− p) + c2λ2 − 2cλ2x+ λ2x2 + 2λ(α+ x− c) + 2
2αλ2
with x = max(cp, θ̄).
Figure 6 displays CS for both free and paid roaming in
terms of λ when using the optimal prices, for α = 1. The
impact on consumer surplus leans towards free roaming: it
yields higher CS than paid roaming, but the relative difference
is quite small, and we may expect that there exist distributions
of θ such that the CS with paid roaming exceeds that with free
roaming. Hence it is not obvious that imposing free roaming
would benefit users as a whole, illustrating that an analysis
such as the present one is of interest.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we have proposed a model, focusing on the
provider and user sides, to investigate the impact of recent UE
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Figure 6. Consumer surplus in terms of λ
decisions forbidding charging for data usage while roaming.
Our results suggest that imposing a switch from paid roaming
to free roaming would favor the most wealthy users, and
that it could be to the detriment of users with intermediate
wealth. Also, the revenue extracted by the provider would be
significantly lower.
Since this effect on users depending on their wealth was
not obvious, we consider that is it worth highlighting and that
such decisions, even if intuitively beneficial for the society,
should be taken with care and their implementation closely
monitored.
Among the limitations of our work, we have considered a
monopolistic operator. It would be interesting to investigate to
what extent our conclusions remain valid in the case of several
competing operators.
In future work, we also intend to study the interactions
among providers of countries with significant roaming traffic
from one to another.
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